







MARKET POWER IN THE SPANISH 
WHOLESALE ELECTRICTY MARKET* 
 









Correspondence: Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis 
Económico. Carretera de San Vicente del Raspeig s/n, San Vicente del Raspeig, 03080, 
Alicante, Spain. e-mail: ciarreta@merlin.fae.ua.es. 
 
Editor: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. 
Primera Edición Junio 2003 
Depósito Legal: V-2868-2003 
  
IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to encourage a discussion 









                                                 
* Financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (BEC 2000-0301) and Ivie  is gratefully 
acknowledged. We thank Jorge de la Cruz for his very helpful research assistance, and seminar 
participants at Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona and Universidad de Alicante for their comments and 
suggestions. We are especially indebted to Eva Ferreira for her invaluable help. 
 
** A. Ciarreta: Universidad de Alicante.  M.P. Espinosa: Universidad del País Vasco.    2
MARKET POWER IN THE SPANISH 
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET 
 










  In the context of the recent electricity market reforms in Europe and the 
US, we evaluate the performance of the Spanish pool. Our method is not based 
on price-cost estimates but rather on the different behavior of operators with 
higher market power as compared to the behavior of more competitive operators. 
Our results indicate that the two larger operators in the market are able to 
increase prices by a significant amount as compared to the situation in which 
each plant is run independently. 
  









 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the context of European deregulation, the Spanish electricity market is un-
dergoing a process of reform with the objective of increasing eﬃciency and
competition. In this paper we explore whether the two larger operators in the
Spanish wholesale market exploit their market power and, if that is the case, to
what extent market power raises price-cost margins.
Market power is an important consideration in the European deregulation of
the electricity industry. Centralized spot markets have been abolished recently
in California and in England and Wales. It has been argued that the problems in
these electricity markets were due to market power coupled with a tight demand-
supply balance (see Green, 2001).1 The Spanish spot market was introduced
in 19982 with rules similar to those guiding the English market at the time.
In the present context of electricity market reforms in Europe and the US, it
seems important to evaluate the performance of the Spanish pool in these years,
given that it shares the features of high concentration and tight demand-supply
balance. Our paper is a ﬁrst step towards exploring the eﬃciency of the Spanish
wholesale market.
A high concentration index together with an inelastic demand suggest that
ﬁrms will use their market power to set prices well above costs. However, de-
pending on other market conditions or auction rules, concentration may give rise
to higher or lower margins. Wolfram (1999) found that for the British market
prices were much closer to marginal cost than most theories predicted, although
she also ﬁnds some evidence of strategic capacity withholding. Explanations for
the restrained price levels were ﬁnancial contracts between the suppliers and
their customers,3 threat of entry and threat of regulatory intervention in the
market.4
In the industrial organization literature several methods have been used to
measure market power in electricity markets. Mount (2001) associates system-
atic patterns of price spikes with market power use in the UK electricity market.
Spear (2001) argues that horizontal market power explains price spikes in peak
periods observed in the California generation market, as well as the reduction in
additions to capacity. Several papers (Green (1994), von der Fehr and Harbord
(1993), Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2000) and Wolfram (1999), among oth-
ers) have used direct measures of marginal cost to calculate price cost margins.
Macatangay (2000) proposes a test of ”suspicious patterns” of bidding behav-
ior based on the slopes of the supply curves; he shows that ”suspects” behave
diﬀerently from the rest and checks whether the strategies of the suspect ﬁrms
aﬀect one another. Bushnell and Saravia (2002) measure the competitiveness
of the New England electricity market by comparing equilibrium prices with a
1See Fabra (2001) for an overview of the literature on electricity markets and empirical
evidence.
2Regulated by Act 2019 of December 26, 1997.
3See Green (1999) on contracts for diﬀerences.
4However, Newbury (2002) argues that many European countries lack the necessary regu-
latory power to mitigate generator market power.
3competitive benchmark: the price that would result if no ﬁrm exerted market
power. They obtain a demand-weighted markup from 4% to 12% depending on
whether equilibrium prices include operating constraints or not.5
Our approach is diﬀerent from previous papers measuring the impact of
market power in that we do not use cost estimates. Rather, we study the
optimal behavior at the electricity auction of ﬁrms with high market share and
compare it to that of small ﬁrms. We model the outcome of the pool as a supply
function equilibrium. There has been some discussion concerning the model that
best suits this type of market. The choice is not without consequences. Some
authors have considered the pool as a continuous share auction (see Klemperer,
2001; Wang and Zender, 2002), and in these models the outcomes are prices
above costs: Participants submit supply functions with slopes higher than the
marginal cost function so that the residual demand for each participant is also
steep and no one has incentives to undercut other competitors; in this manner,
high prices may be sustained in equilibrium. However, other authors have used a
discrete, multiple-unit model, where prices can be any real number but suppliers
must submit a ﬁnite number of price-quantity bids; von der Fehr and Harbord
(1993) and Fabra have shown that there is an incentive to undercut the rival’s
price slightly and increase output. The discrete auction model yields either non
existence of pure-strategy equilibrium or a Bertrand like equilibrium. This is an
extreme result that could be tested with electricity auction data. Considering
this debate, we have chosen to analyze also the implications of other models
(Cournot competition) for the presence of market power.6
The supply function of a large operator7 at the pool is obtained by aggre-
gating the supply functions of each generating plant under its control. In the
absence of any market power, a generating plant would bid at the pool inde-
pendently of whether it belongs to a large operator or to a small ﬁrm, and thus
the supply function of a larger operator would coincide with the supply curve
obtained as the sum of the supply functions of similar plants under the control
of small ﬁrms. Of course, in real auctions production units will take into ac-
count their eﬀect on other production plants under the same ownership and will
respond to their incentive to restrict output and raise prices (i.e. to bid a supply
curve more to the left). Larger generators are very often marginal bidders at
the auction, determining the price that is paid to all plants for all units sold.
This impact on equilibrium prices creates an incentive to oﬀer supply curves
which are to the left of the equivalent supply curves of small generators. Our
measure of market power is based on this diﬀerence on supply curves between
larger and small operators at the pool.
More precisely, to measure market power we compare the behavior at the
5In the I.O. literature there is a long tradition of price-cost measurement. See for example
Nevo (2001), who estimates price-cost margins in the cereal industry and separates these
margins into three sources of market power: product diﬀerentiation, multiproduct ﬁrm pricing
and collusion.
6We have not considered models with collusion (sustained through the repeated nature of
the game) because in those models it is less clear how to single out an outcome (multiplicity
of equilibria and asymmetric players).
7In what follows we consider that the size of a generator is its capacity.
4pool of ”technologically similar” plants, ones under the ownership of larger
generators and the others under the ownership of smaller ﬁrms. We choose
for the comparison plants which are technologically similar and compare their
bids for the same auction (same day and same time) so that demand and cost
conditions coincide. Thus, any systematic diﬀerence in their supply functions
can only be attributed to the market power of larger generators. In this paper
we observe this diﬀerent behavior in terms of supply curves at the pool and
measure the impact on equilibrium prices.
It is worth noting that, compared to previous works based on price-cost
margin estimates, our method provides a lower bound for that margin. In
other words, our competitive benchmark is a situation in which each plant
is run independently (and the equilibrium price that would be determined in
that case) but, since the number of plants is not inﬁnite, each plant would bid
above marginal cost. We argue in the paper that the diﬀerence between our
competitive benchmark and marginal cost is small.
Our main ﬁndings for the Spanish pool are that the two larger operators do
exploit their market power and consistently submit supply curves which are to
the left (higher prices and lower capacity) of the competitive benchmark. We
also estimate the increase in price-cost margins for peak and oﬀ-peak hours.
These results are somewhat consistent with those of Wolfram (1998) who ﬁnds
evidence that in the British market the larger supplier submitted higher bids
for similar plants.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a very brief description
of the Spanish pool. Section 3 presents the supply function equilibrium model,
where we show that in equilibrium a plant under the ownership of a larger
generator has a supply function which is to the left of the supply curve of a plant
under the ownership of a smaller generator; results for Cournot competition are
also provided. In Section 4 we deﬁne a measure of the market power of a
generator, based on the impact that its bidding has on the equilibrium price:
if all the plants of a generator were run independently we would obtain an
equilibrium price; when these plants coordinate their bids the equilibrium price
is higher. This price diﬀerence yields a measure of market power. The rest of
the paper presents our empirical results for the Spanish pool. In Section 5 we
describe our competitive benchmark and the procedure for measuring each ﬁrm’s
market power and in Section 6 the statistical analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Spanish wholesale electricity market
The Spanish pool for electricity (day-ahead market) started its operations in
January 1998.8 Two companies, Endesa (EN) and Iberdrola (IB), own the
majority of generating capacity, while Unión Fenosa (UF) and Hidrocantábrico
(HC) are smaller competitors; all are private companies and each owns nuclear,
8After Act 54/1997 liberalizing the market was approved in November 1997 and Act
2019/1997 established the rules of the production market.
5thermal plants and hydroelectric units. At the beginning of 2002, EN sold a
small part of its capacity (Viesgo) to the Italian company ENEL, which has
become the ﬁf t hc o m p e t i t o ri nt h i sm a r k e t .
The pool works as follows. Before 11:00 a.m., qualiﬁed buyers and sellers of
electricity present their oﬀers for the following day. Each day is divided into 24
hourly periods.
Sellers in the pool present bids consisting of up to 25 diﬀerent prices and
the corresponding energy quantities for each of the 24 periods and for each
generating unit they own; the prices must be increasing. If no restriction is
included in the oﬀer this is called a ’simple oﬀer’. A seller may also present a
’complex oﬀer’ which may include indivisibility conditions, a minimum revenue
condition, production capacity variation (load gradient conditions) and sched-
uled stop conditions. The pool administrator consolidates the sales bids for each
hourly period to generate an aggregate supply curve.
Qualiﬁed buyers in the pool present oﬀers.9 Purchase bids state a quantity
and a price of a power block and there can be as many as 25 power purchasing
blocks for the same purchasing unit, with diﬀerent prices for each block; the
prices must be decreasing. The pool administrator constructs an aggregate
demand with these oﬀers.
In a session of the daily market the pool administrator combines these of-
fers matching demand and supply for each of the 24 hourly periods and de-
termines the equilibrium price for each period (the system marginal price) and
the amount traded.10 This matching is called the base daily operating schedule
(PBF).A f t e rt h ebase daily operating schedule is settled, the pool administrator
evaluates the technical feasibility of the assignment; if the required technical re-
strictions are met then the program is feasible; if not, some previously accepted
oﬀers are eliminated and others included to obtain the provisional feasible daily
schedule (PVP). This reassignment ends at 14:00. By 16:00 the ﬁnal feasible
daily schedule (PVD) is obtained taking into account the ancillary services as-
sigment procedure. There is also an intra-day market to make any necessary
adjustments between demand and supply.11 The result is called the ﬁnal hourly
schedule (PHF).
9From January 1st 2003, all buyers of electricity are considered qualiﬁed buyers. Before
that date qualiﬁed buyers were those with consumption greater or equal to 1 GWh per year.
The required consumption has decreased over time from 5GWh (December 1998) to 3GWh
(April 1999), to 2GWh (July 1999) and to 1 GWh (October 1999).
10Appendix 1 describes the procedure for calculating the system marginal price when de-
mand and supply intersect in a vertical or horizontal section of either the aggregate demand
or the aggregate supply curves.
11The intra-day market started working in April 1998. In the ﬁrst three months it had 2
sessions per day. From July 1998 it had 4 sessions per day and from September 1998 it had
5 sessions. Now it has at least 6 sessions.
63 The model
We represent strategic interaction in the electricity market through a supply
function equilibrium model,12 where each generator decides a supply curve for
each of the plants it owns. This model ﬁts well the bid rules of the Spanish pool
since generators have to submit a schedule of up to 25 prices and quantities,
for each production unit and for each hourly period.13The supply curve of a
generator is then obtained as the sum of the supply curves of all its individual
plants. The supply function equilibrium model is considered more appropriate
when ﬁrms are constrained to maintain the bid for a period of time or when
there is demand uncertainty. In the case of the Spanish pool, bids are short-lived
(1 hour) and there might be some demand uncertainty but, more importantly,
generators ”shall be required to submit electric power sale bids to the market
operator for each of the production units they own for each and every one of
the hourly scheduling periods.”14 This rule implies that all the production
units should submit bids even though in periods of low demand some of them
are not going to produce. Other authors have analyzed the electricity market
as Cournot competition (see Borenstein and Bushnel, 1997) or as a sealed-
bid, multiple-unit, private-value auction (see Wolfram, 1999, von der Fehr and
Harbord, 1993, and Marín and García-Díaz, 2000).15Our main results are not
speciﬁc to supply function competition and we also comment on the results
under Cournot competition and multiple-unit auction models.
Our purpose is to analyze the equilibrium behavior of generators with dif-
ferent sizes and hence diﬀerent market power in the pool. In our model the
participants in the generation market will have diﬀerent numbers of production
units: a generator with m plants (generator 1), a generator with k plants (gen-
erator 2) and a third generator with only one plant (generator 3). We assume






where qij denotes electricity produced by plant j owned by generator i.T h e
choice of a linear marginal cost is frequent because it allows the solution to
12See Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Green and Newbury (1992), Green (1996), Baldick,
Grant and Kahn (2000), and Bolle (1992).
13For a further discussion of the advantages of the supply function equilibrium model over
Cournot, see Baldick, Grant and Kahn (2000).
14Electricity Market Activity Rules, p. 6. There is an exception to this rule when the
production unit has a bilateral contract which, due to its characteristics, is excluded from the
bidding system.
15Our purpose in this paper is to detect the presence of market power but we do not test
our model against other models for the electricity market. In fact, other models could have
similar implications to ours concerning market power.
7the system of diferential equations to be found more easily. Green and New-
bury (1992) use quadratic marginal cost, which requires numerical solution of
diferential equations.16
All plants are identical. This is obviously a simplifying assumption, useful
to explain diﬀerences in bidding behavior due to diﬀerences in market power,
not diﬀerences based on cost asymmetries.
Demand function is linear:
Dt = at − bpt + ut (2)
where ut is a random error with zero mean and pt denotes price at period t.N o t e
that the slope of the demand function b is assumed independent of time, while
the intercept at may vary over time. The electricity auction is a uniform price
auction; thus, all buyers (sellers) whose oﬀer has been accepted pay (receive)
the marginal price for the electricity required (supplied) in their oﬀer. Firms are
assumed to be risk neutral and therefore they maximize their expected payoﬀ.
Each plant’s bid at the auction will be represented here as a continuous
supply function. The problem for generator 1,w i t hm plants, is to decide the
supply curve for each plant j at each period t, qt
1j(pt),s u c ht h a ti tm a x i m i z e s












1j(pt)) for j =1 ,...m
Since all plants owned by the same generator are identical, qt
i(pt) will denote
the supply curve of any plant belonging to generator i. Substituting (1) and (2)

















at − bpt − kqt
2(pt) − qt
3(pt) − (m − 1)qt
1j(pt)
2
for j =1 ,...m
The ﬁrst order conditions for generator 1 are:






























We look for solutions of the form:
qt
i(pt)=Ai + Bipt i =1 ,2,3
and obtain:
A1 = A2 = A3 =0
B1 =
b + kB2 + B3
m + cm[b + kB2 + B3 +( m − 1)B1]
B2 =
b + mB1 + B3
k + ck[b + mB1 + B3 +( k − 1)B2]
(3)
B3 =
b + mB1 + kB2
1+c[b + mB1 + kB2]
Solving the system we get the equilibrium values B1 (b,c,m,k), B2 (b,c,m,k),
B3 (b,c,m,k), as functions of the parameters of the model, and thus, the equi-
librium supply curve for each plant.17 S i n c ew ea r ea s s u m i n gt h a tb and c are
constant over time, the slope of the supply function is also constant over time.
The main result of this section, which will be tested later on, is the following:
Proposition 1 Large generators submit plant supply curves which are to the
left of the plant supply curves of small generators:
17When the cost function in (1) includes a term diqi, the supply function has a non-zero
intercept.
9B1 (b,c,m,k) ≤ B2 (b,c,m,k) <B 3 (b,c,m,k)
The result can be checked from the expressions for B1, B2 and B3 in (3).
Figure 1 illustrates the proposition for parameter values b =1 , c =0 .2, m =5 ,
and k =5 . A generator with a large number of plants has to take into account
the eﬀect of a plant’s bid on the price received by its other plants. Therefore,
to maximize total proﬁts, each plant restricts output, that is, it oﬀers a lower
amount at each price, or asks for a higher price for each energy volume. Since
all production units have the same technology, the diﬀerent positions of the
supply curves are due only to the diﬀerent market power of the generators.
Increasing output (moving the supply curve to the right) has a negative eﬀect
on all the other plants’ proﬁts. A larger generator would internalize these eﬀects
and therefore choose for each plant a supply curve with a higher slope.
Figure 1. Parameter values: b =1 , c =0 .2, m =5 , k =5 , a =1 0 .
The equilibrium values for supply curves are given by B1 = B2 =0 .46575 and
B3 =2 .6542.
A similar result is obtained under Cournot competition. If ﬁrms compete in
the level of output of each plant, we obtain in equilibrium: q1 ≤ q2 <q 3 (see
Appendix 2).
The aggregate supply function is:
St = Bpt + εt (4)
where B =( mB1 + kB2 + B3) and εt is an error collecting random break-
downs in production, etc.
Matching aggegate demand and aggregate supply (equations 2 and 4)w e
















Note that qt and pt are higher in high demand periods (high at)a n da r e
aﬀected by demand and supply errors (ut and εt, respectively).
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         e n e r g y     
       4 A measure of market power under supply func-
tion competition
The standard measure of market power is the Lerner index (Lerner, 1934):
p−c
p ,
where c is marginal cost. In this section we propose a measure of market power
which is a lower bound for the Lerner index. Thus, if we ﬁnd that market power
is signiﬁcant according to our index, we can be sure that
p−c
p is also signiﬁcant.
The measure is based on the comparison of the behavior of a given generator,
referred to a particular production unit, to the behavior of a generator who owns
only one production unit. If a plant in a larger generator were to bid the same
supply curve as a plant from a generator with only one plant, then it would
not be using its market power associated with size. However, from Proposition
1 we would expect a larger generator to instruct its plants to restrict output,
submitting supply curves to the left. Any diﬀerence between the two supply
curves will be attributed to market power and the impact on equilibrium prices
will be used to construct a measure of individual market power.
More precisely, we deﬁne a synthetic generator with m plants as a generator
which does not maximize joint proﬁts for the m plants, rather it instructs each
plant to present a supply curve at the pool to maximize the plant’s proﬁts. In
other words, a synthetic generator does not internalize the eﬀects of its plants
on each other’s proﬁts, i.e. it does not exploit its market power.
First, we construct a measure of generator 1’s market power. In our analysis
of the pool equilibrium, we replace generator 1 by synthetic generator 1.E a c h
plant in synthetic generator 1 maximizes proﬁts individually; as a result, the
supply function equilibrium is given by:
Bs
1 =
b + kB2 + B3 +( m − 1)Bs
1





k + ck [b + mBs





1+c[b + mB1 + kB2]
where superscript s denotes that the ﬁrm is synthetic. Solving this system
we obtain Bs
1 = B3 >B 2. The equality between Bs
1 and B3 is not surprising:
since synthetic generator 1’s plants are maximizing individual proﬁts, they be-
have exactly as the single-plant generator 3 does. It is worth noting that the
equilibrium values for B3 and B2 are diﬀerent from before, since generators 2
and 3 react to the behavior of generator 1.
12Denote by pB(at) the expected equilibrium price at the pool when ﬁrms
submit supply curves given by system (3) and pB1s(at) the expected equilibrium
price with supply curves given by system (7), i.e. when the slope of the aggregate
supply function is B1
s
=( mBs
1 + kB2 + B3) .We deﬁne a measure of market














In words, we measure the market power of a ﬁrm as the percentage increase
in price obtained by joint proﬁt maximization as compared to individual plant






=( mB1 + kBs
2 + B3).
Market power for ﬁrm 3 is zero by deﬁnition since Bs
3 = B3.
Our measure of market power is a measure of market power with respect to
minimum size (one plant): The market power of a generator with one plant is
set at zero and we measure the market power of larger generators.
We can also measure the impact of joint market power as follows. Deﬁne
pB1s+2s(at) as the competitive benchmark, that is the price that would be deter-
mined were each plant to behave independently at the pool. The competitive
benchmark is the price that would be determined in the least concentrated mar-
ket structure, given the existence of (m + k +1 )plants and no entry. When the
number of plants tends to inﬁnity then Bs
1 tends to 1
c,t h a ti s ,e a c hﬁrm submits
its marginal cost function at the pool.18 This is what is usually called ’compet-
itive benchmark’ in the relevant literature and if the number of plants is high
( a si su s u a l l yt h ec a s e )t h et w od e ﬁnitions will be similar.














Our measure is a lower bound for the standard index of market power,
p−c
p ,
since pB1s+2s(at) >c , and will be interpreted as such, rather than as the ”true
measure” of market power. In the example above (see Figure 1) market power
for ﬁrms 1 and 2 is 0.72243 and joint market power is 0.8358, according to our
measure. We can also compute the Lerner index in the example:
p−c
p =0 .85158,
which is close to our measure of market power. An advantage of our procedure
for measuring market power (expressions (8) and (11))i st h a ti ts h o w st h e
contribution of asymmetric ﬁrms to the price-cost margin.
It is worth noting that our measure of market power could be deﬁned also
for the case of Cournot competition: pB(at) is simply the Cournot equilibrium
price and pB1s+2s(at) is the price that would be determined if plants owned by
ﬁrms 1 and 2 behaved as independent ﬁrms.
Similarly, in a multi-unit auction pB(at) is the auction equilibrium price and
pB1s+2s(at) would be the auction equilibrium price when bids do not maximize
joint proﬁts for the generators but individual proﬁts of the production units.
However, there is an important diﬀerence between this model and ours. In a
multi-unit auction, all generators who are not the marginal unit bid so as to
sell all capacity having marginal cost below the marginal price;19 a consequence
of this result is that only the marginal generator could have any market power.
This implication could be tested with auction data.
5 Estimating Competitive Bidding Behavior
We want to examine the eﬀect of each ﬁrmb4s market power. The reference
point is the bidding behavior at the pool of a generator who did not exercise
any market power. Larger generators present bids for each unit that maximize
joint proﬁts for the ﬁrm. At the same auction, there are small generators with
units of similar characteristics. We approximate the competitive behavior for
a larger generator using the bids at the same auction of small generators. The
two larger generators in the Spanish wholesale market are Endesa (EN) and
Iberdrola (IB). Therefore, we ﬁrst build a so-called ”Synthetic Endesa” (ENs)
and a ”Synthetic Iberdrola” (IBs). Then, we compare the auction outcome to
the outcome obtained after replacing the supply functions of the ﬁrms by the
supply curves of the synthetic ﬁrms. More precisely,
19See Theorem 1 in Marín and García-Díaz (2000).
141. First, we build the empirical supply functions of Endesa (EN), Iberdrola
(IB), Unión Fenosa (UF), and Hidrocantábrico (HC) using hourly data.
We measure the ﬁrst two ﬁrms’ market power. Then, we aggregate all
of them and generate, together with the rest of the smaller production
agents, the aggregate supply function, St, for each day and hour. Finally,
we intersect the aggregate supply curve with the demand schedule, Dt,
and compute the equilibrium price pt ignoring technical restrictions. The
result is a time series of prices pt:
St = Dt =⇒ pt
According to our model the observed price depends on demand and supply





The computed prices do not take technical restrictions into account. Tech-
nical restrictions should not not represent a signiﬁcant downward bias for
prices since they involve only a very small fraction of the total volume
traded in the daily market.20
2. Second, we use UF and HC’s production units to build the synthetic
Endesa (ENs) and the synthetic Iberdrola (IBs). Then, we replace the
original supply functions of both ﬁrms by the synthetic ones, and ob-
tain an aggregate supply S
ENs+IBs
t . Intersecting this aggegate supply
S
ENs+IBs
t with the demand schedule Dt, the result is a time series of the
equilibrium prices as they would have been if Endesa and Iberdrola had
followed their synthetic supply curves.
S
ENs+IBs
t = Dt =⇒ p
ENs+IBs
t
That equilibrium price depends on demand and supply parameters as well






Note that the error ηt, with zero mean, is diﬀerent from εt. T h i si ss o
because productive plants owned by EN and IB have been replaced by
similar plants owned by HC and UF.
20In June 2002, technical restrictions aﬀected 1.08% of the volume in the daily market, and
implied an increase on the average price in the daily market of just 0.065cEur/kWh
15We can also repeat the procedure for each ﬁrm individually to ﬁnd the
proportion of the expected price variation which is due to each ﬁrm:
SIBs















where νt and µt are random error terms with zero mean.








B+b , that is, the time series p
ENs+IBs
t
and pt only diﬀer in the realization of a random term with zero mean,
εt−ηt
B+b .
Under the alternative hypothesis, if the large generators have market
power, then BENs+IBs
<B , which implies that we should expect pos-
itive values for the diﬀerence:
pt − p
ENs+IBs










and also for MP(at).
Our empirical test is based on that implication of the model, although
it does not depend on the speciﬁc functional form of demand and supply
schedules. Under the null hipothesis pt and p
ENs+IBs
t will only diﬀer
in the realization of a random error, while under the alternative, pt and
p
ENs+IBs
t will show a systematic diﬀerence which is a function of at .21.
We can extend this analysis to individual market power of the two larger
generators and check whether pENs
t and pIBs
t are diﬀerent from pt.
21See Delgado (1993), Cabus (1998), Koul and Schick (1997, 2001), Hall and Hart (1990)
and Ferreira and Stute (2002).
166 Statistical Analysis







or, in other words, we test whether the functions pB(at) and pBENs+IBs(at) are
identical or not.
The hypothesis under test is:
Ho : pB = pBENs+IBs,
to be tested against
H1 : pB >p BENs+IBs
That is, under the null the two series pt and p
ENs+IBs
t only diﬀer in the


































where B is a Brownian motion. Furthermore, we have that
17P[s u p
0≤u≤1
B(u) ≤ δ]=2 Φ(δ) − 1
where Φ(δ) is the distribution function of the normal distribution. Thus,
P[T ≤ δ] → 2Φ(δ) − 1
We will follow the same procedure to test the hipotheses:
Ho : pB = pBENs, to be tested against H1 : pB >p BENs
and
Ho : pB = pBIBs, to be tested against H1 : pB >p BIBs
6.1 Descriptive Analysis
Before presenting the test results we provide some descriptive analysis. The
data consists of hourly prices and quantities from the daily electricity whole-
sale market.22 There are a total of 5881 observations, corresponding to the
period May 2001 to December 2001, and 8760 observations in 2002, classiﬁed
in peak, oﬀ-peak 1 and oﬀ-peak 2 hours (high, low and intermediate demand,
respectively).23
As a result, we have the following time series: the observed prices, the
synthetic prices obtained by replacing EN’s bids by its synthetic ﬁrm bids, the
synthetic prices obtained by replacing IB’s bids by the synthetic bids, and ﬁnally
the synthetic prices obtained by replacing both EN’s bids and IB’s bids by their
respective synthetic bids.
Figures 2 present, for July 2001, the time series of observed prices, compared
to IBs prices, ENs prices and (IBs+ENs) prices. It can be checked in these
ﬁgures that for that month the synthetic price series is consistently below the
observed price for each ﬁrm, particularly for IB.
22We do not consider the energy traded in the intra-day market, which amounts to less than
5% of the energy traded in the daily market.
23Data are available from May 2001. Following the pool administrator classiﬁcation, data
are divided into three categories:
Peak demand hours: From 16:00 to 22:00 week days (excluding holidays) in November,
December, January, and February. From 9:00 to 15:00 week days in March, April, July, and
October.
Oﬀ-peak 1 demand hours: From 0:00 to 8:00 every day of the year, plus Saturdays, Sundays,
and holidays. August is also included.
Oﬀ-peak 2 demand hours: From 6:00 to 16:00 and from 22:00 to 00:00, week days in
November, December, January, and February. From 8:00 to 9:00, and from 15:00 to 00:00,
week days in March, April, July, and October. From 8:00 to 00:00 week days in May, June,
and September.
186.2 Testing
First, we present a test of unconditional means. The null is that market power
is zero. We test this hypothesis for each of the larger ﬁrms and we also test
whether joint market power is zero. This test focuses on the mean of the time
series and does not make use of any further information contained in the data.
Results are reported in Table 1. We run the test considering all the observations
(column two), peak demand hours (column three), oﬀ-peak 2 demand hours
(column four), and oﬀ-peak 1 hours (column ﬁve), for each of the hypotheses to
be tested, as explained above.
Table 1. Market Power
2001 Type of Hours




































Standard deviations in brackets
May 2001 to December 2001: 504 peak hours observations, 1826 oﬀ-peak 2 hours,
and 3551 oﬀ-peak 1 hours.
On average, in 2001 the diﬀerences between the observed prices and the
”synthetic prices” are positive. The magnitude of these diﬀerences (from 6% to
61%) is explained by the low elasticity of the demand schedule. Small changes
in the amount of energy supplied imply large changes in equilibrium prices. One
result stands out: Market power is greater for IB than it is for EN, even though
EN has a higher market share and higher capacity than IB (see Table 4).
For periods of low demand, market power for EN turns out to be negative.
Note that the measure for market power we are using is a lower bound, so
when it is negative it contains no useful information. A negative value for the
diﬀerence P −P
ENs
means that in periods where there is excess capacity small
generators are bidding higher prices than EN. This could be due either to some
costs diﬀerence that we are not capturing or that EN bids more closely to costs
than small generators do in low demand periods.
Next, we carry out a test of test of conditional means. This is necessary to
test whether the price series are the same or not (not only whether they have
the same mean). We compute the T statistic for the Ferreira-Stute’s test. In
our model at is a measure of intensity of demand at each hour t.A sa ni n d e x
28for demand level we choose for each t t h ea m o u n td e m a n d e da tt h em a x i m u m
price allowed in the auction (18.03 cents).24 Table 2 presents our results.





May 2001 to December 2001.
Considering all observations, the statistics in Table 2 allow us to reject the
null hypotheses. Thus, we can conclude that plants under the ownership of
large generators do not bid as small generators’ plants do. Their bids determine
higher equilibrium prices.
Again, there is a diﬀerence between the two larger ﬁrms. EN seems to be
exerting a lower impact on equilibrium prices than IB. This may be either a
consequence of a more restrictive bidding behavior on the part of IB, especially
during peak hours, or reﬂect diﬀerences in technology. The theoretical model in
Section 3 does not distinguish between the diﬀerent production technologies and
thus it traces market power only to the level of capacity. However, hydro and
thermal generating units have diﬀerent technical characteristics and they may
imply diﬀerent capabilities to exploit the market power associated with size.
To explore this possibility, Table 3 presents the technology of the plants
setting the system marginal price and the ownership of the plants. In oﬀ-peak
1 hours, conventional thermal generation units set the marginal price in almost
60% of the auctions, while in peak hours and oﬀ-peak 2 hours hydro units set
the price in around 80% of the auctions.
Hydro units are very ﬂexible, they allow energy storage and quick output
adjustment. For that reason these resources can be used strategically. Accord-
ing to Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2000), a price-taking ﬁrm with hydro
resources would allocate these resources to peak hours, while a ﬁrm with market
power is likely to allocate more hydro resources to oﬀ-peak periods than to peak
periods.25 This greater ﬂexibility of hydro resources may be behind the greater
market power of the company IB as shown in the data. IB has a 52% of its
capacity in hydro generating units and 28% in thermal units, while for EN the
percentages are reversed (27% and 56%, respectively).
7 Concluding Comments
In this paper we have presented some preliminary results. Our next step is to
extend the sample using all the auction days available.
24Note that at = qt +1 8 .03b where qt i st h ea m o u n td e m a n d e da tap r i c e18.03 at each t.







IB UF  HC  Others  Total 
Base  45.1 %  34.2 %  6.19 %  12.62 %  1.9 %  3528 hours 
Off-Peak  35.67 %  50.45 %  9.07 %  4.51 %  0.3 %  1803 hours 
Peak  28.73 %  59.4 %  6.47 %  5.4 %  0 %  549 hours 




49.2% 34.3% 11.2%  4.6%  0.7%  46904 MW 






Plants EN  IB  UF  HC Others  Total 
Total  45.1 %  34.2 %  6.19 %  12.62 %  1.9 %  3528 hours 
Nuclear  0 %  0 %  0  %  0 %  0 %  0 % 
Thermal  36.54 %  7.4 %  6.19 %  7.61 %  0 %  57.79 % 
Hydro  8.56 %  26.74 %  0 %  5.016 %  0 %  40.31 % 
Others  0 %  0 %  0 %  0 %  1.9 %  1.9 % 





Plants EN  IB  UF  HC Others  Total 
Total  35.67 %  50.45 %  9.07 %  4.51 %  0.3 %  1803 hours 
Nuclear  0 %  0 %  0 %  0 %  0 %  0 % 
Thermal  9.21 %  2.73 %  8.52 %  1.05 %  0 %  21.5 % 
Hydro  26.46 %  47.72 %  0.55 %  3.46 %  0 %  78.2 % 
Others  0 %  0 %  0 %  0 %  0.3 %  0.3 % 





Plants EN  IB  UF  HC Others  Total 
Total  28.73 %  59.4 %  6.47 %  5.4 %  0 %  549 hours 
Nuclear  0 %  0 %  0 %  0 %  0 %  0 % 
Thermal  8.53 %  4 %  4.87 %  0.6 %  0 %  18 % 
Hydro  20.2%  55.4 %  1.6 %  4.8 %  0 %  82 % 
Others  0 %  0 %  0 %  0 %  0 %  0 % 
 
 
Table 3. Firms and plants fixing the system marginal price; all hours, base, off-
peak and peak hours. 
 Installed 
capacity 
EN IB UF  HC 
      
Nuclear  17 %  20 %  18 %  6 % 
Thermal  56 %  28 %  44 %  77 % 
Hydro  27 %  52 %  38 %  17 % 
Total  23099 MW  16088 MW 5253 MW  2566 MW 
 
Table 4.  Generators Installed Capacity, 2001. There are several question that we have left out. The possibility of collusion
has been ignored. It is possible that part of the market power that we measure
in this paper is due to the repetition of the auction, which would allow ﬁrms
to sustain outcomes which are more cooperative than the one-shot outcome. In
this case the supply curve that we observe would be to the left of the one-shot
supply curve predicted by the model. It is diﬃcult to empirically distinguish
between the impact of collusion and the eﬀect of ’static’ market power. But there
are some arguments in favor of market power: collusion would not necessarily
imply a diﬀerence in behavior between large and small generators if collusion is
market-wide (although collusion only between the two larger generators would
give rise to such a diﬀerence). The analysis of collusion would require further
work and is left for future research.
Another important issue which has been neglected here is the fact that pro-
ducers may own some of the companies who buy electricity in the pool and this
may change their incentives to raise prices. Actually, market share of IB and EN
on the demand side is not far from their market share on generation. However,
this vertical structure does not eliminate the incentives to raise prices on the
wholesale market if we take into account that the ﬁnal price to consumers is
regulated and its level is likely to depend on the pool prices. The explicit mod-
elling of this vertical structure and its impact on market power in the electricity
market are left for future research.
Other important issues omitted include capacity choice (see Castro, Marín
and Siotis (2001). Finally, an interesting issue would be the comparison between
the performance of the Spanish pool and that of other markets, such as New
England, California, and France.26
26The French pool Powernext started operating in November 2001.
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349 Appendix 1. The system marginal price
The equilibrium price is the price obtained from the intersection of aggregate de-
mand and aggregate supply curves. At the Spanish pool that price is calculated
as follows (see OMEL’s Electricity Market Activity Rules):
- The marginal price shall correspond to the price of the last block of elec-
tric power supply oﬀered for sale submitted by the last production unit whose
acceptance was necessary to satisfy the matched demand.
- The market operator shall accept, at the marginal price, the total electric
power oﬀered in those sale bids whose prices are below the marginal price.
- The market operator shall accept, at the marginal price, the total electric
power demanded by buyers in all the electric power purchase bids whose max-
imum prices are above the marginal price, except in cases where there is not
enough electric power at prices that are lower than or equal to the marginal
price to satisfy the demand that incorporates prices that are higher than the
marginal price.
- If there is excess supply at the marginal price, it shall be proportionately
deducted from the sales of those units whose price is equal to the marginal price
- If there is excess demand at the marginal price, it shall be proportionately
deducted from the quantities of electric power included in the blocks of those
purchase bids whose price is equal to the price of the last accepted purchase
bid.
When demand and supply cross in a vertical section of the supply curve,
according to these rules the marginal price is lower than the market clearing
price.
359.1 Appendix 2. Cournot competition













b2c2 + bc + kbc+ k
 a
b3c3 +2 b2c2 +2 kb2c2 +2 b2c2m +3 kbc+3 bcm +3 kbcm+4 km
q2 =

b2c2 + bc + bcm + m
 a
b3c3 +2 b2c2 +2 kb2c2 +2 b2c2m +3 kbc+3 bcm +3 kbcm+4 km
q3 =

b2c2 + kbc+ bcm + km
 a
b3c3 +2 b2c2 +2 kb2c2 +2 b2c2m +3 kbc+3 bcm +3 kbcm+4 km
From these expressions it can be seen that
q1 ≤ q2 <q 3
10 Appendix 3
Claim 2 When the number of plants m + k +1tends to inﬁnity and all gen-
erators are synthetic, the solution of the supply curve equilibrium tends to the
competitive solution, i. e. each ﬁrm bids its marginal cost function.
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Thus, in the limit the supply curve for each plant is p = cq, which coincides
with the marginal cost curve C (q)=cq.
3711 Appendix 4. Building a Synthetic Firm
We consider the electricity market on June 28th, 2001, at 18:00 hours. Puentes
Garcia Rodriguez 2 (Code PGR2), is a production unit that belongs to Endesa.
It uses lignite and imported coal as input. The plant which is closest in technical
characteristics is Meirama 1, (code MEI1), which belongs to Unión Fenosa. The
table below shows the bids by PGR2, the bids by MEI1, and the corresponding
synthetic PGR2, called SPGR2.
Table . Building Synthetic PGR2
PGR2 bids MEI1 bids SyntheticPRG2 bids
P Q Cum Q P Q Cum Q P Q Cum Q
Stretch 1 0 216 216 0 532 532 0 331.65 331.65
Stretch 2 1.192 19 235 15 31.2 563.2 15 19.45 351.1
Stretch 3 1.283 106.1 341.1
Stretch 4 9.9 9.9 351
Capacity 351 563.2 351.1
If we follow the same procedure with all the plants, we can build the synthetic
supply curves of Iberdrola and Endesa in the way described above. Figure 3
below contains the corresponding synthetic supply curves.
The graph shows that the diﬀerence between the system marginal price
(SMP), 5.566, and the one that would have been obtained with the synthetic
ﬁrms, 5.316, is 0.25. That is, the SMP was 4.47% higher than it would have
been had the ﬁrms behaved more competitively. That is the measure of joint













0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
DEMANDA
OFERTA
OFERTA SINTETICA
Figure 3